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Scientific Cultures of Non-Knowledge in the Controversy over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO).
The Cases of Molecular Biology and Ecology
GAIA 15/4(2006): 294 – 301
http://www.oekom.de/zeitschriften/gaia
The journal GAIA is based on the initiative of scientists of the Zentrum Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, University of Konstanz, of the Institute for Economy and the Environment, University of St. Gallen, as well as of the Departement of Environmental Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.
How should science and society deal with the unknown, e. g., with risks that are not known or risks of which we do not even know that they are not known? The ways in which science produces knowledge also include specific practices of dealing with nonknowledge, which differ significantly between scientific disciplines such as molecular biology and ecology
[...]
Considering these and other examples, we argue that environmental politics and research should take into account not only known and (more or less) well-defined risks and uncertainties, but also completely unknown, unanticipated and for a long time unrecognised effects. This corresponds with new insights from science and technology studies showing that the sciences do not only generate knowledge but also increase ignorance concerning the possible side effects of scientific innovations and their technological application.
In order to clarify that such non-knowledge is not simply “given by nature”, but the result of the growth of knowledge itself, the British philosopher of science Jerry Ravetz has termed it “man-made” or “science-based ignorance” (Ravetz 1990; for the distinction of the terms “ignorance” and “non-knowledge”, see below).
[...]
Epistemic Cultures as Cultures of Non-Knowledge
Knorr Cetina (1999) has shown that two influential scientific (sub-)disciplines – high-energy physics and molecular biology differ widely in their practices of “making knowledge”. Thus, as she concludes, the sciences can be understood as being differentiated into various “epistemic cultures” or “scientific cultures of knowledge”. These consist of and are constituted by sets of specific practices of generating, validating, and communicating knowledge, each of which is characteristic of its respective (sub-)disciplinary field. What is remarkable in Knorr Cetina’s study is that these cultures of knowledge include specific practices of producing and dealing with non-knowledge. Thus they can also be interpreted as “cultures of non knowledge”.
As Knorr Cetina demonstrates, high-energy physics is very attentive to the limits of its knowledge: disturbances, distortions, errors, unexpected events, or uncertainties. Its epistemic strategy focuses on the active search for what she has termed “liminal knowledge”, i. e., the expertise of dealing with the boundaries of knowledge. In contrast, molecular biology is not (indeed perhaps cannot be) very interested in the limits of its knowledge or in its self-generated non-knowledge. If experiments fail or expose unforeseen results, molecular biologists usually do not explore the causes any further, but vary the conditions of the experiment until the expected type of outcome emerges (Knorr Cetina 1999). To refer to this heuristic strategy, Knorr Cetina has coined the term “semi-blind variation” (Knorr Cetina 1999, p. 110). She argues that this should not be interpreted as a sign of epistemic sloppiness, but as a requirement of the specific research fields and objects of molecular biology
[...]
Integrating Non-Knowledge into Democratic Deliberation and Policy
We started our argument referring to cases in which knowledge was ignored by society and non-knowledge was not recognised, resulting in harmful effects. This led to the political demand to take possibly harmful unknown unknowns into account. In our so-called knowledge society, epistemic cultures develop specific expertise not only in the production of knowledge, but also in the handling of non-knowledge. Our comparison of molecular biology and ecology in the field of agro-biotechnology exposed the existence of two different scientific cultures of non-knowledge one that is based on the reliability and regularity of causal interrelations established in the controlled setting of the laboratory, the other focussing on the ubiquity of unanticipated, unforeseeable, or even unrecognisable effects under varying real-world conditions. We conclude that the specific traits of the epistemic cultures help to characterise science-based non-knowledge in detail. Moreover, our analysis provides a source to critically discuss and broaden our societal capability to handle situations of non-knowledge.
As in science, societies can, in principle, choose between a control-oriented and an uncertainty-oriented approach (table 2) in situations of unknown risks. Experts from specific scientific disciplines may advocate those options that are more familiar or more consistent with their own epistemic style. Each culture of non-knowledge is associated with specific (implicit/explicit) motives and based on specific (known/unknown) implications and limitations. At the same time, they are equally “scientific”, “rational”, and potentially helpful. This has far-reaching consequences, not only for science studies but also for political deliberation and decision making in various fields. It seems of major importance
- to acknowledge non-knowledge in the sciences as well as in
the public debate;
- to elaborate and preserve a variety of cultures of non-knowledge as a basis of intercultural critique and as a rich source of future action;
- to think of different societal options of precautionary political actions, referring to different cultures of (non-)knowledge;
- to societally reflect upon and discuss the world views and implicit value systems inherent in different cultures of non-knowledge and actions of precautionary politics.
The fact that we can discern different scientific cultures of non-knowledge raises several questions which are likely to be of fundamental importance for future socio-ecological developments:
What can modern societies and their institutions learn from control-oriented and from uncertainty-oriented scientific cultures of non-knowledge? Is it realistic to think we can completely avoid non-knowledge and risks based on non-knowledge by controlling realworld situations? To what extent is this socially desirable?
What are the alternatives to “first-order knowledge” via controlled experiments and to precautionary strategies based on the enhancement of system control? How can first and second order approaches in science and policy be integrated in a sensible way?
The present societal and political reactions towards emerging risk technologies such as biotechnology suggest that we are currently extending the range of uncertainty-oriented approaches in order to avoid negative socio-ecological (side-)effects in the present and future (Böschen 2005).
The following examples can be interpreted as first steps in this direction: the post-market monitoring of GMO and their general environmental surveillance; the step-by-step and case-by-case procedures regarding the permission to release and market GMO (e. g., Tiedje et al. 1989); the development of “second-order indicators” (second-order knowledge) to
evaluate the specific risk associated with the release of specific
chemicals (Scheringer 2004, p. 94) or genetically modified plants
(Menzel et al. 2005) even before they are released. With the recent turn toward precautionary politics within the EU, a broader discussion and a more detailed conceptualisation seem adequate.
Io conosco la legislazione europea in merito ai GMO, utilizza l'approccio precauzionale e la cultura epistemiologica dell'incapacita' di predire tutte le possibili ramificazioni ed agire sotto ad un regime di incertezza, in questo senso pare quasi che il legislatore stia dicendo agli americani, fate vobis, poi noi vedremo, con l'aggiunta che questo ostacola anche la crescita in europa del potere monopolistico di Monsanto.
Ovvero la legislazione europea ed anche quella italiana sono perfettamente adeguate alle condizioni socio-econo-tecnologiche odierne, in tutti i sensi.
Scientific Cultures of Non-Knowledge in the Controversy over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO).
The Cases of Molecular Biology and Ecology
GAIA 15/4(2006): 294 – 301
http://www.oekom.de/zeitschriften/gaia
The journal GAIA is based on the initiative of scientists of the Zentrum Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, University of Konstanz, of the Institute for Economy and the Environment, University of St. Gallen, as well as of the Departement of Environmental Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.
How should science and society deal with the unknown, e. g., with risks that are not known or risks of which we do not even know that they are not known? The ways in which science produces knowledge also include specific practices of dealing with nonknowledge, which differ significantly between scientific disciplines such as molecular biology and ecology
[...]
Considering these and other examples, we argue that environmental politics and research should take into account not only known and (more or less) well-defined risks and uncertainties, but also completely unknown, unanticipated and for a long time unrecognised effects. This corresponds with new insights from science and technology studies showing that the sciences do not only generate knowledge but also increase ignorance concerning the possible side effects of scientific innovations and their technological application.
In order to clarify that such non-knowledge is not simply “given by nature”, but the result of the growth of knowledge itself, the British philosopher of science Jerry Ravetz has termed it “man-made” or “science-based ignorance” (Ravetz 1990; for the distinction of the terms “ignorance” and “non-knowledge”, see below).
[...]
Epistemic Cultures as Cultures of Non-Knowledge
Knorr Cetina (1999) has shown that two influential scientific (sub-)disciplines – high-energy physics and molecular biology differ widely in their practices of “making knowledge”. Thus, as she concludes, the sciences can be understood as being differentiated into various “epistemic cultures” or “scientific cultures of knowledge”. These consist of and are constituted by sets of specific practices of generating, validating, and communicating knowledge, each of which is characteristic of its respective (sub-)disciplinary field. What is remarkable in Knorr Cetina’s study is that these cultures of knowledge include specific practices of producing and dealing with non-knowledge. Thus they can also be interpreted as “cultures of non knowledge”.
As Knorr Cetina demonstrates, high-energy physics is very attentive to the limits of its knowledge: disturbances, distortions, errors, unexpected events, or uncertainties. Its epistemic strategy focuses on the active search for what she has termed “liminal knowledge”, i. e., the expertise of dealing with the boundaries of knowledge. In contrast, molecular biology is not (indeed perhaps cannot be) very interested in the limits of its knowledge or in its self-generated non-knowledge. If experiments fail or expose unforeseen results, molecular biologists usually do not explore the causes any further, but vary the conditions of the experiment until the expected type of outcome emerges (Knorr Cetina 1999). To refer to this heuristic strategy, Knorr Cetina has coined the term “semi-blind variation” (Knorr Cetina 1999, p. 110). She argues that this should not be interpreted as a sign of epistemic sloppiness, but as a requirement of the specific research fields and objects of molecular biology
[...]
Integrating Non-Knowledge into Democratic Deliberation and Policy
We started our argument referring to cases in which knowledge was ignored by society and non-knowledge was not recognised, resulting in harmful effects. This led to the political demand to take possibly harmful unknown unknowns into account. In our so-called knowledge society, epistemic cultures develop specific expertise not only in the production of knowledge, but also in the handling of non-knowledge. Our comparison of molecular biology and ecology in the field of agro-biotechnology exposed the existence of two different scientific cultures of non-knowledge one that is based on the reliability and regularity of causal interrelations established in the controlled setting of the laboratory, the other focussing on the ubiquity of unanticipated, unforeseeable, or even unrecognisable effects under varying real-world conditions. We conclude that the specific traits of the epistemic cultures help to characterise science-based non-knowledge in detail. Moreover, our analysis provides a source to critically discuss and broaden our societal capability to handle situations of non-knowledge.
As in science, societies can, in principle, choose between a control-oriented and an uncertainty-oriented approach (table 2) in situations of unknown risks. Experts from specific scientific disciplines may advocate those options that are more familiar or more consistent with their own epistemic style. Each culture of non-knowledge is associated with specific (implicit/explicit) motives and based on specific (known/unknown) implications and limitations. At the same time, they are equally “scientific”, “rational”, and potentially helpful. This has far-reaching consequences, not only for science studies but also for political deliberation and decision making in various fields. It seems of major importance
- to acknowledge non-knowledge in the sciences as well as in
the public debate;
- to elaborate and preserve a variety of cultures of non-knowledge as a basis of intercultural critique and as a rich source of future action;
- to think of different societal options of precautionary political actions, referring to different cultures of (non-)knowledge;
- to societally reflect upon and discuss the world views and implicit value systems inherent in different cultures of non-knowledge and actions of precautionary politics.
The fact that we can discern different scientific cultures of non-knowledge raises several questions which are likely to be of fundamental importance for future socio-ecological developments:
What can modern societies and their institutions learn from control-oriented and from uncertainty-oriented scientific cultures of non-knowledge? Is it realistic to think we can completely avoid non-knowledge and risks based on non-knowledge by controlling realworld situations? To what extent is this socially desirable?
What are the alternatives to “first-order knowledge” via controlled experiments and to precautionary strategies based on the enhancement of system control? How can first and second order approaches in science and policy be integrated in a sensible way?
The present societal and political reactions towards emerging risk technologies such as biotechnology suggest that we are currently extending the range of uncertainty-oriented approaches in order to avoid negative socio-ecological (side-)effects in the present and future (Böschen 2005).
The following examples can be interpreted as first steps in this direction: the post-market monitoring of GMO and their general environmental surveillance; the step-by-step and case-by-case procedures regarding the permission to release and market GMO (e. g., Tiedje et al. 1989); the development of “second-order indicators” (second-order knowledge) to
evaluate the specific risk associated with the release of specific
chemicals (Scheringer 2004, p. 94) or genetically modified plants
(Menzel et al. 2005) even before they are released. With the recent turn toward precautionary politics within the EU, a broader discussion and a more detailed conceptualisation seem adequate.
Io conosco la legislazione europea in merito ai GMO, utilizza l'approccio precauzionale e la cultura epistemiologica dell'incapacita' di predire tutte le possibili ramificazioni ed agire sotto ad un regime di incertezza, in questo senso pare quasi che il legislatore stia dicendo agli americani, fate vobis, poi noi vedremo, con l'aggiunta che questo ostacola anche la crescita in europa del potere monopolistico di Monsanto.
Ovvero la legislazione europea ed anche quella italiana sono perfettamente adeguate alle condizioni socio-econo-tecnologiche odierne, in tutti i sensi.
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