Forum libero

http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/ubs.pdf

(il libor determina/influenza ottomilmilioni di cose a quanto pare, qunto si paga di interessi ad esempio, o quanto costa un mutuo) -->

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LIBOR is the most frequently used benchmark for interest rates globally, referenced
in transactions with a notional outstanding value of at least USD 500tn.

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quelli virgolettati sono estratti di conversazioni di dipendenti UBS:

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“if you keep 6s [i.e. the six month JPY LIBOR rate] unchanged today... I will fucking do one humongous deal with you ... Like a 50, 000 buck deal, whatever. I need you to keep it as low as possible ... if you do that ... I’ll pay you, you know,
50,000 dollars, 100,000 dollars ... whatever you want ... I’m a man of my word”


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Trader A also asked certain Brokers to make false bids and offers (referred to as “spoofs”) on cash trades in the market in order to skew market perceptions of the rates at which cash could be borrowed or lent in the interbank market. The intention was that the JPY LIBOR submissions of Panel Banks that observed cash market rates when determining their submissions would be skewed. For example, between 7 July
2008 and 29 June 2009, false offers were discussed on the telephone by Trader A with Broker A on at least 12 occasions. In one such conversation on 27 January 2009, Broker A explained that he had been: “... offering...some cheap 3s all morning and 1 shouted them- down at [Panel Bank 3] as well...we were offering them at 50 mate...that wasn’t even true”.

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67. In an electronic chat on 2 February 2007, Trader A explained the aim of the 2007
campaign to an External Trader at a Panel Bank. He explained that:
a. His efforts to date were already producing results because he was: “...mates with the cash desks, [Panel Bank 3] and i always help each other out” with the result that “3m libor is too high cause I have kept it artificially high.” and that
b. he was currently keeping that LIBOR rate one basis point too high; and that He would take trading positions that would benefit from a reduction in the spread between the three month JPY LIBOR rate and another reference rate, TONAR6, in April and May 2007;

c. In May 2007, he would manipulate three month JPY LIBOR one basis point too low.


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Conclusioni:

Nature, seriousness and impact of the breach - DEPP 6.5.2G(2)
184.
UBS’s breaches were extremely serious. They took place over nearly six years across
a number of LIBOR currencies and EURIBOR. There was a culture where the
manipulation of the LIBOR and EURIBOR setting process was pervasive. The
manipulation was conducted openly and was considered to be a normal and
acceptable business practice by a large pool of individuals. Approximately 40
individuals were directly involved in making or receiving requests, including 11
35
Managers. In addition, at least a further two Managers and five Senior Managers were
aware of the practice.
185. UBS’s misconduct extended beyond UBS’s own internal submission processes to
sustained and repeated attempts to influence the submissions of other banks, acting in
collusion with Panel Banks and Brokers at a number of different Broker Firms. Some
UBS employees colluded with Brokers in serious market misconduct such as making
false bids and offers in the cash market and disseminating false suggestions of
appropriate LIBOR rates to Panel Banks and other market participants.
186. There were serious systemic weaknesses in the firm’s systems and controls. This
meant that UBS’s misconduct continued even after the BBA and the EBF had raised
concerns about LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions. While UBS attempted to
improve its systems and controls in 2008 and again in 2009, they remained inadequate
throughout the Relevant Period.
187. LIBOR and EURIBOR are the prevalent benchmark reference rates in a number of
relevant markets including markets in OTC derivatives contracts and futures contracts
traded on exchanges such as LIFFE in London. LIBOR and EURIBOR also have a
wider impact on other markets. The integrity of benchmark reference rates such as
LIBOR and EURIBOR is of fundamental importance to both UK and international
financial markets. UBS’s misconduct threatened the integrity of those benchmarks
and confidence in or the stability of the UK financial system.
188. UBS could have caused serious harm to other market participants if the final LIBOR
and/or EURIBOR fixes were affected by the actions of UBS’s managers and
employees on any given day.
The extent to which the breach was deliberate or reckless - DEPP 6.5.2G(3)
189.
The FSA does not conclude that UBS as a firm engaged in deliberate misconduct.
Nevertheless the improper actions of many UBS employees involved in the
misconduct were at least reckless and frequently deliberate. UBS, because of a poor
culture in its interest rate derivatives trading business and weak systems and controls,
failed to prevent the deliberate, reckless and frequently blatant actions of its
employees.
The size, financial resources and other circumstances of the firm DEPP 6.5.2G(5)
190.
UBS, and in particular its investment bank, is one of the biggest, most sophisticated
and well-resourced financial services institutions in the UK. Serious breaches
committed by a firm such as UBS merit the highest penalties.
The amount of benefit gained or loss avoided - DEPP 6.5.2G(6)
191.
UBS sought to manipulate LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to improve
the profitability of trading positions. The FSA has not determined the net impact on
UBS’s profits that is attributable to this misconduct. However, it is clear that
substantial sums were at stake.

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1. For the reasons given in this notice, the FSA hereby imposes on UBS AG (“UBS”) a
financial penalty of £160,000,000 in accordance with section 206 of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “Act”).
2. UBS agreed to settle at an early stage of the FSA’s investigation. UBS therefore
qualified for a 20% (stage 2) discount under the FSA’s executive settlement
procedures. Were it not for this discount, the FSA would have imposed a financial
penalty of £200,000,000 on UBS.

cioè un miliardo e mezzo di dollari ca, la final notice linkata è del 19 dicembre 2012 e la cifra deve essere pagta entro e non oltre il 9 gennaio 2013 dicono, deve ancora arrivare la sanzione dell'EU.