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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Hacker#cite_no...

Peter Michael Stephan Hacker (born 15 July 1939) is a British philosopher. His principal expertise is in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is known for his detailed exegesis of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his outspoken conceptual critique of cognitive neuroscience

Philosophical inquiry is therefore very different from scientific inquiry, and Hacker maintains accordingly that there is a sharp dividing line between the two: "Philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge, but to human understanding" (quoted from "An Orrery of Intentionality"). This has led him into direct disagreement with "neuro-philosophers": neuroscientists or philosophers such as Antonio Damasio and Daniel Dennett who think that neuroscience can shed light on philosophical questions such as the nature of consciousness or the mind-body problem. Hacker maintains that these, like all philosophical problems, are not real problems at all, but mirages arising from conceptual confusion. It follows that scientific inquiry (learning more facts about humans or the world) does not help to resolve them. His 2003 book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience", co-authored with neuroscientist Max Bennett, contains an exposition of these views, and critiques of the ideas of many contemporary neuroscientists and philosophers, including Francis Crick, Antonio Damasio, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, and others.

Sempre dello stesso autore

http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Phil_neuro.pdf

Philosophical foundations of neuroscience.

The problem at issue here is the nature of connection between the features of the experiments described in psychological/mentalistic terms and the features described in
spacio-temporally-based physical terms. This question is an aspect of the long-standing problem of the relationship between mind and matter, which has a history dating back to the time of the ancient Greeks. The issue was rekindled by the rise of Newtonian physics during the seventeenth century, and it generated a huge body of speculation and argumentation during the second half of the twentieth century.

It is neither appropriate nor feasible try to review or explain here the complexities of contemporary philosophical opinions on this question, except to say that the reigning view is “materialism,” and that: (1), there is no agreement among its proponents as to how to make rational good sense of this doctrine (Horgan, 1994); and (2), the doctrine, and its supporters, seem, nevertheless, to have strongly influenced the thinking of many neuroscientists.

The central thesis of materialism is that:
“The human body is a causally complete physico-chemical system: although the body is highly susceptible to external causal influences, all physical events in the body, and all bodily movements are fully explainable in physico-chemical terms.” (Horgan, 1994:472)

This thesis is, from a contemporary physics point of view, very obscure: What does “causally complete physico-chemical system” mean? It seems to be referring back to the seventheenth/nineteenth century classical-physics conception of nature, which is now known to fundamentally false. If the doctrine does indeed assume a classical-physics-typeof conception of nature, then every bodily movement would indeed be in principle fully explainable in physico-chemical terms. But no reference to mental states or events occurs in classical physics. Hence one is faced with a question that the proponents of materialism have debated at length: how does one inject causally efficacious mind into this causally complete physical description of nature that make no mention of mind.
The ingenuity of philosophers has provided many possible answers, but every proposal seems flawed to other philosophers, and debate continues.

In addition to the problem of trying to attach causally efficacious mind onto a causally complete mindless theory, there is a still more basic problem: classical physical theory is
known to be fundamentally false, and in principle inapplicable to systems, such as brains, that depend sensitively upon, for example, the motions of ions. And there is also the problem that the physico-classical aspect of contemporary physical theory, by itself, does not yield any predictions about empirically accessible data. To obtain even statistical predictions in quantum theory one needs to bring in “The Observer,” who is described, fundamentally, in psychological/mentalistic terms. And this “Observer” plays a participatory role in the quantum formulation: he is not the purely passive observer of classical physics. He enters into the dynamics in a causally efficacious way.
In view of these profound, and apparently profoundly relevant, deviations of contemporary physics from what is essentially the seventeenth century materialist creation of Isaac Newton, it is strange that twenty-first century neuroscientists shouldadhere so unwaveringly to that seemingly inappropriate and ill-defined doctrine based on a now-known-to-be-fundamentally-false physical theory.

What orthodox quantum theory affirms, and materialism appears to deny, is that psychologically described realities enter fundamentally into the scientific description of phenomena, and have, per se, causal effects that are not explained solely in terms of the physical laws that are the generalization of the physical laws of classical physical theory.
These causal effects are, however, explained by using other laws of quantum physics, which have no analog in classical physics.

The big problem with materialism as a basis for neuroscience is that it elevates to primary status, by fiat, the (actually nonexistent) physical entities of classical physics, and
relegates to secondary status the experiential realities that are the primary variables of pragmatic empirical science. Classical physics does not explain how functional properties
come to be connected to experiential realities, and hence fails to explain the causal efficacy of our thoughts. The power of our thought to influence bodily action seems, therefore, from the standpoint of classical physics, to be some sort of illusion, or at least unexplained mystery. Quantum theory, on the other hand, displays the mechanism of conscious control, and hence dispels the mystery. The details are given in a later section.
[Horgan, Terence E. (1994). Physicalism. In Samuel Guttenplan (Ed.) A companion to the philosophy of mind (471-479). Oxford: Blackwell.]

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> > > > > Sì, ma la foto?
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> > > > gay
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> > > Sì, ma la foto?
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> > Nn la posto per rispetto della campesina.
>
> Ma non dicevi che ormai ti tira meno che a Ordine?

Ho la libido sotto le scarpe ma questo non vuol dire che nn riesca nemmeno a fare un cazzo di marmo da spaccare in mano (cit required)